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The Moral Fog of War: 
Vietnam Through Cracked 
Reformed Glasses
by Sylvan Gerritsma
Editor’s Note: A version of this article was published in the proceedings of a biennial conference of the Association for the 
Advancement of Dutch American Studies (DUTCH AMERICANS AND WAR: UNITED STATED AND ABROAD, 
edited by Robert Swierenga, et.al., Van Raalte Press, 2014. They have granted us permission to publish this version, 
though we are responsible for any errors not in the original publication. Also, a part of this article was published in 
Christian Courier, November 14, 2016, no. 3044, which also gives us permission to publish, though we assume responsibil-
ity for all errors from the original.
My father was a proud World War II veteran1 
from Sioux Center, Iowa. So I was born and grew 
up there and eventually went to Dordt College. 
That is not just a biographical tidbit. It is the 
background for the deep-seated Reformed world-
view I imbibed there—a worldview developed 
particularly by Dutch thinkers with the heritage 
of Abraham Kuyper.2 You may recognize that 
worldview in this essay. 
My college years approximately coincided 
with the rise and peak of national anti-establish-
ment protest focused most sharply against the 
Vietnam war, although Dordt College and Sioux 
Center certainly were not hotbeds of counter-cul-
tural protest. My father’s generation was deeply 
committed to American exceptionalism (though 
we never heard that term) and was deeply wor-
ried about the threat of global communism to 
the world, which depended largely on America to 
restrain that threat. Those commitments deeply 
pervaded the Sioux Center of my youth. But 
the draft indiscriminately swept up kids from 
Berkeley as well as from Sioux Center.
After graduation I, too, would have been 
drafted, but I volunteered in order to be assured 
of the opportunity to become an officer. So after 
basic training and advanced infantry training, I 
completed officer candidate school in engineer-
ing but then was commissioned as a 2nd Lt in mil-
itary intelligence. I spent the next year in the in-
telligence center of the Army, researching POWs, 
interrogation techniques, brainwashing, and 
related issues. Then, after completing parachute 
training, I was deployed to Vietnam for a year. 
About half of my time there in the 101st Airborne 
Division was spent as an administration officer; 
the other half I was in charge of an electronic 
surveillance unit. We implanted, monitored, and 
maintained seismic and magnetic sensors to track 
Sylvan Gerritsma graduated from Dordt in 1968, then 
served in the US Army 1968-1971. Among the military 
honors received, “somewhat ironically,” were the Bronze 
Star for contributions in a combat zone and, more signifi-
cantly, the Soldiers Medal, the Army’s highest honor for 
heroism not involving conflict with an enemy. He is now 
a retired businessman, living in St Catharines, Ontario, 
and volunteering in various capacities. As he states, “I 
have been blessed for the past 50 years by the Christian 
worldview which I began to learn at Dordt.” 
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enemy movement. In 1970-71, when I was there, 
U.S. military activity was still intense but past 
its peak, and the number of troops was being re-
duced. 
For my father’s generation, the need for 
Christian discernment about U.S. responsibil-
ity in the world and the justification for war did 
not feel so compelling. Especially after Pearl 
Harbor, it did not require sophisticated insight 
to conclude that we Americans were on the side 
of the angels and that we knew who the demons 
were. During the next twenty years of cold war, 
it was still easy to cast ourselves as Christians 
fighting for a righteous cause against the world-
wide threat of atheistic communism. But as 
post-war U.S. military interventions prolifer-
ated—Korea, Egypt, Lebanon, Cuba, Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Grenada, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Persian Gulf, Panama, Columbia, 
Kuwait, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Serbia, 
Pakistan, and more—the conviction of our righ-
teous purity faltered. Central to that faltering 
was Vietnam. And the big question of the purity 
of our cause was upstaged by questions about the 
morality of our methods. Let me illustrate with a 
story.
During my first week in Vietnam, we had a 
training class on rules of engagement, reviewing 
the Geneva Conventions and combat rules: You 
fight soldiers; you don’t harm women, children, 
civilians and friendlies, etc. We all knew that 
from previous training. This review class was 
taught by an experienced sergeant who did the 
proper and correct job expected of him. 
Then came time for questions.
Up stands a boy who looks hardly old enough 
to have finished high school. He was in Vietnam 
before, he says, serving on a long-range recon-
naissance patrol team. That’s a few tough, highly 
trained guys sent into enemy territory, lightly 
armed, to spy. Being lightly armed, they can’t 
afford to be discovered. In enemy territory that 
means likely death.
So, in a baffled, naive, almost hurt boyish 
voice, he asks, “Do you really mean that now if 
we are discovered in the jungle by a woman and 
a couple of kids, we can’t kill them anymore?" 
That is not merely an interesting story. The 
meanings and implications of it just don’t quit. 
You could start by asking how you would feel if 
the woman and children killed were your mother 
and sisters. Or if they were not killed, how would 
you feel if one of the consequently dead patrol 
members was your brother or father. On a big-
ger than personal level, we were in Vietnam to 
“win the hearts and minds of the people.” That’s 
what counter-insurgency is mainly about. As an 
aside, think about what an evangelistic concept 
that is: “winning hearts and minds.” Anyway, if 
you were in the community of the dead mother 
and children, would their deaths, to conceal the 
presence of a few alien soldiers, win the hearts 
and minds of the community? 
But the story doesn’t end there. The instructor 
has to answer the question. He is an experienced, 
well-trained soldier. Likely he has heard similar 
questions before; perhaps he has experienced the 
dilemma. As robotically as he would swing his ri-
fle toward enemy fire, he presses the rewind but-
ton and carefully repeats what he mouthed ear-
lier and what the questioner had heard repeatedly 
before: “The rules say…”. He didn’t even have to 
wink or continue with “but…”. The answer was 
clear, and it wasn’t in his words. Nobody could 
say that he didn’t teach the rules. Yet everybody 
knew he didn’t.
But that still isn’t the end of the story. There 
were about fifty people there. I was there. Every 
one of us knew the rules. By the rules it looked 
like we might have right there a real live war 
criminal. Every one of us should have reported 
that. Was I, were we all, complicit in the cover up 
of possible war crimes? How could this happen? 
Is this simply a conspiracy of lawlessness? And 
this is not just a rare incident. You have all read 
in the news many variants of this story, from My 
Lai to Abu Ghraib.
The agonizing dilemmas illustrated by that 
story are even further complicated by deep per-
sonal damage inflicted by previous military expe-
rience. Let me illustrate that with a story very dif-
ferent and at the same time containing common 
elements. It’s a story of evil, evil also in me, evil 
deeper and more complex than we usually real-
ize. More importantly, it also hangs on, however 
desperately and tenuously, to God’s promise that 
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grace overcomes evil. I relate the story leaving the 
moral complexity unresolved.
The scene: a hot evening almost fifty years 
ago at the little sandbagged hootch where I slept 
in Camp Eagle about fifty miles south of the 
demilitarized zone between North and South 
Vietnam. 
Knock, knock. 
“Who’s there?”
It’s the commanding officer of my unit! This 
has never happened. When 
he wants you, he sends a 
private to summon you.
“Do you know Sergeant 
Prince? “ he asks. 
Thoughts run through 
my mind. Sgt. Prince. 
Richard Prince. An ap-
propriate name. Genuinely 
a prince among men. 
Richard, as in Richard the 
Lion-hearted, King of England. Richard Prince, 
a soft-spoken, kind, gentle, noble man. A career 
soldier who had already been in the Army twelve 
years, but not the stereotypical hard, macho, in-
sensitive creature that the word sergeant brings to 
mind. This is his third tour in Nam. He is with 
us just briefly between assignments.
Then the bombshell: “He’s in the bunker with 
a grenade threatening suicide. Can you do some-
thing?" 
No longer are thoughts running sequentially 
through my mind. They are spasming. Auto pilot 
takes over because I don’t have the wherewithal 
to deal with this thoughtfully. Can any autopilot 
be programmed for this?
Auto pilot should have said, “Sir, I am just a 
23-year-old kid. You have been in the Army 23 
years. Why are you asking a kid to do a man’s 
job?”
But that response is not programmed into my 
autopilot. Twenty-three years of Christian nur-
ture and two years of Army indoctrination have 
programmed me to automatically take up the 
call of duty.
So I find myself in the bunker—Sgt. Prince, 
a grenade, and me. The inside of the bunker is 
about the size of two coffins side by side but four 
feet high, sandbagged on all sides and roof with 
crude benches along the walls and a few small 
firing ports. The entrance is a maze to prevent ex-
plosions outside from directly hitting occupants, 
but now also preventing quick escape or disposal 
of the grenade. 
Other thoughts about Sgt. Prince spasm 
through my mind. Earlier he has told me that 
he is torn apart by the impending failure of his 
marriage, largely due to his absence for three of 
the last six years. Likely, 
the psychological damage 
he suffered from combat 
has compounded the prob-
lems. From 8,000 miles 
away he is powerless to do 
anything about his wife’s 
affair. He so dreaded this 
tour in Nam that before he 
left home, he loosened cru-
cial steering components of 
his car and drove it down a rough winding road 
as fast as he dared, hoping for suicide disguised 
as an accident. 
All of these things and more had also given 
this gentle boyish man an edge of cold, hard 
fury, usually well concealed. He had told me of 
seeing a close buddy killed. A few days later the 
small unit he commanded overran an enemy po-
sition. There appeared an enemy soldier, hands 
up, surrendering. With the thought of their al-
most still warm buddy in their minds, some of 
his men turned their guns to shoot the bastard. 
He stopped them. He knew the rules of war. 
He might have cynically articulated those rules 
something like this: A prisoner must be treated 
according to the Geneva Conventions. It’s like 
the end of a basketball game. You shake hands. 
“Good game buddy. Would you like to join us 
for a beer? And by the way, would you like to tell 
us, please, the location of the mortars from which 
your teammates are raining explosives on us?”
He put a furious burst of bullets through the 
prisoner himself.
But I digress. I am in the bunker, somehow 
now armed with a flashlight, obligated by duty to 
come out with an unexploded grenade and two 
live soldiers but having no idea how that could 
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happen. So for the next three hours, Sgt. Prince 
and I share the crazy camaraderie of courting 
death. How much does he desire death? How 
much do I love life? Repeatedly he pulls the pin 
and later replaces it. If he lets it go, we have four 
seconds. At one point with the pin out, he orders 
me to “turn off the damn light, sir." Throughout 
all this, the thought races through me, “What if 
he lets it go? Do I try to throw my body on it to 
save him? Or do I dive for the exit? Could I pick 
it up and throw it out of a gun port all within 
four seconds? Could I even find it in the dark?”
I remember little of the conversation, perhaps 
because I had no strategy to deal with this. “I 
got the right to kill myself,” he says and tells me 
repeatedly to get out so he can do it. The fact that 
I outrank him is ridiculously irrelevant in all of 
this. I follow his orders—except the order to get 
out. 
After a few hours he gives me the grenade. 
Outside, the scene is surreal. There is an audience 
sitting on lawn chairs on the hillside as if this 
is live outdoor theater. The only thing missing is 
the popcorn.
Astonishing today, but the event was abso-
lutely normal then. The next day life goes on as 
if nothing has happened. Duty—other duty—
calls. 
I saw Sgt. Prince only once after that, a night 
or two later, alone, in company headquarters, 
handcuffed to a filing cabinet like a short-leashed 
dog. He looked at me plaintively. Not a word 
passed between us.
War: what a murky, muddled moral morass! 
What is war anyway? To get the issues before us, 
I will state some of this with brutal starkness, 
simplification, and hyperbole. Nuance can be de-
bated elsewhere.
First, the standard definition of war is some-
thing like this: It is an instrument of statecraft. In 
just-war theory, that distinguishes it from private 
violence, even private violence on a large scale like 
that of drug cartels or terrorist organizations. That 
line gets fuzzy in cases like insurrection, terror-
ism, and civil war, but the pure idea is that war is 
between states—not between individuals or non-
governmental groups. War is also subject to rules 
of warfare, like the Geneva Conventions and just-
war theory. 
Isn’t that a charmingly comforting, sterile 
definition of war, fervently desired but fanciful? 
One could be forgiven for likening it to profes-
sional sports. Yes, there is a bit of physical contact 
between players, but there are nice rules limiting 
that contact. Players wear uniforms to distin-
guish the teams and to distinguish players from 
spectators. Rarely would spectators be involved 
or hurt and then only as collateral damage. There 
are referees, governing bodies, appeals boards, 
and courts to deal with violators, both in the 
stands and on the fair level playing field.
Let’s try a very different possible definition. 
War is a wild, unrestrained melee between two 
or more nations (or other entities such as guerilla 
groups) that may require nearly the total resourc-
es (i.e., not just military) of the involved nations 
(meaning that civilians as part of the military-
industrial complex are also mobilized) and in 
which almost all rules other than winning have 
failed or been abandoned.
But even that is a rather academic, sanitized 
definition. So let’s be blunt. What is the first 
thing that comes to mind when you think about 
war? It’s killing, purposeful killing, killing on a 
large scale.
We hear about killing in the news and see it 
portrayed so casually in media that we are easily 
desensitized to it. But did you ever think about 
how hard it is to kill? I mean real close-up killing 
in which you see the fear in the man’s eyes, you 
see the messy blood, you bludgeon, you plunge in 
the knife or bayonet, you hear him beg for his life 
for the sake of his children. A shudder of revul-
sion overwhelms most of us when we even think 
of it.
That’s because God did not create us to kill. 
Genesis 9 says that when we kill, we are destroy-
ing the image of God. It is as if we are trying to 
destroy the closest thing we see to God—burn-
ing Him in effigy. That doesn’t come naturally. 
We are not created to do that.
But the sad reality is that in this time—be-
tween the Fall and Christ’s return—some evil 
is so powerful and threatening that most of us 
think it has to be opposed by deadly force. So, 
until Christ returns, armies have to make ordi-
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nary people into killers. That’s not easy to do. 
Consider some of the evidence of how it can be 
done, beginning with relatively unsophisticated 
methods and proceeding to subtle but more pow-
erful ones.
A baffling discovery was made after battles 
during the U.S. Civil War 150 years ago. The 
guns of the dead and wounded were collected 
from the battlefields to be used again. Remember 
that these were single shot muskets. After each 
shot, powder and bullet had 
to be pushed in from the 
front of the barrel. Ninety 
percent of these guns were 
found loaded but not fired. 
More than half had more 
than one load. And that is 
despite the fact that it takes 
95 percent of the time to 
load and only 5 percent to 
fire. How could that be? 
It was discovered that 
soldiers had just pretended 
to fire and then reloaded as 
if they had fired. Of those 
who did pull the trigger, 
few fired to hit the enemy. All of this occurred 
because they could not find it within themselves 
to kill. They actually found it easier to risk being 
killed than to kill. Even as late as World War II, 
studies showed that only about 15-20% of indi-
vidual riflemen could bring themselves to fire at 
an exposed enemy soldier. That is alarming for an 
army. If 85% of your soldiers really don’t want to 
kill, it’s hard to win a war. It’s worse than having 
85% of librarians illiterate. So armies had to fix 
that problem.3
By the time I was in Vietnam, the figures 
were inverted. Over 90% could kill. That’s an as-
tonishing change. You could call that behaviour 
modification, but it is really closer to psychologi-
cal DNA change. The person, the self, at a very 
deep level is modified into a creature God never 
intended that creature to be. How can that be 
done?
At an elementary level, armies and nations do 
that by demonizing the enemy. In Vietnam we 
were fighting the demon of godless communism. 
Of course, nations and armies can also manufac-
ture demons where there are none, as Hitler did 
with Jews, gypsies, and others. Real or imagined, 
evil creatures are easier to kill than people.
Similarly, armies tend to dehumanize the en-
emy. It’s easier to kill a “gook” in black pajamas 
than a person—even an evil person. 
Demonization and dehumanization could 
be seen as two forms of hate. Sixty years after 
his war, my father still talked with bitter hatred 
about the “Japs” as being 
a devious species, and he 
spoke almost with relish 
about seeing them asphyxi-
ated and incinerated with 
flame throwers in caves to 
which they had retreated. 
When I took bayonet 
training, we were told to 
imagine we were stabbing 
the hated imaginary man 
back home in bed with our 
wife or girl friend. It’s easier 
to kill what you hate. So 
armies find it effective to 
inspire hate.
But let’s go a step deeper, getting back to defi-
nitions of war we earlier examined. Is war really 
a game played by nice law-abiding gentlemen 
under clearly defined rules? It settles us comfort-
ably and shields us from the horrors of war to 
tell ourselves that. We can then dismiss atrocities 
simply as violations of the rules, unusual excep-
tions, a few bad apples in the barrel. But is it pos-
sible that beneath this public and accepted set of 
rules there is a powerfully functioning alternate 
set of rules more deeply indoctrinated than the 
official ones, and that this set of rules explains a 
lot of what actually happens in the military? Then 
our first story is not so much a matter of fifty 
men complicit in a war crime as it is of fifty men 
working under alternative rules so deeply indoc-
trinated into them that these alternative rules are 
mainly subconscious. 
As an aside, I think quite a bit of the non-
combat immorality often associated with soldiers 
(drugs, sex, foul language, alcohol, pillaging) is 
also partially explained by the unspoken defini-
But the sad reality is that 
in this time—between the 
Fall and Christ's return—
some evil is so powerful 
and threatening that most 
of us think it has to be 
opposed by deadly force. 
So, until Christ returns, 
armies have to make 
ordinary people 
into killers.
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tion of army as the camaraderie of those living 
by an intimately understood different set of rules. 
That would help to explain what my pastor told 
me before I left for basic training: a large per-
centage of Christian young men suspend their 
Christian morality and life-style during the two 
or three years they are in the army, then revert 
back to their former behaviour when they return. 
The depth of that camaraderie also helps to ex-
plain the high rate of divorce among combat vet-
erans: the depth of commitment and attachment 
to buddies is often deeper than to spouse.
I anticipate skepticism about all of this. 
Come on. Don’t try to tell us that twenty years of 
Reformed nurture and education can be upend-
ed by a few months of army training. So let me 
present just a few examples of how the alternative 
values begin to supplant or at least co-exist with 
official ones, and how all of that is unofficially 
indoctrinated. I’ll do it in bullet form if you’ll 
allow the pun:
• When I began basic training, most of us 
were draftees—not volunteers. Within 
weeks, the army had us singing and 
marching to songs that glorified military 
camaraderie and disdained civilians. We 
were mainly unaware of the irony.
• Later I was in officer candidate school. 
Surely they would teach leaders to obey 
the rules. One rule was that we must be in 
bed from 10 PM to 5:30 AM. But every 
minute during the day was regimented. 
When could we polish boots, get equip-
ment and clothes ready for inspection, do 
the academic study and any thing person-
al like reading and writing letters? If we 
were naïve enough to ask or try to use the 
impossibility of the rules as an excuse for 
not accomplishing all that, the sarcastic 
response was, “Ask the good fairy to do 
it." So we went for months getting two to 
four hours of sleep per night, doing our 
work by flashlight, ready to hop into bed 
at a moment’s notice if our lookout spot-
ted an officer coming.
• Part of the time during that same officer 
training, we were systematically underfed. 
One solution was to arrange to smuggle 
in fast food. But that was strictly forbid-
den, extremely difficult to arrange, and 
punished severely if we were caught. But 
periodically we were coyly asked if we had 
done so yet. 
Now in case your non-military minds are still 
reeling, wondering what the unspoken message 
is, it is this: if you fifty guys are too dumb to 
muster the collective ability to evade the rule by 
smuggling food when you are hungry, how could 
you ever lead men in battle? That is the micro 
message. The macro message is this: live by the 
real rules; watch out for the official ones. It’s all 
about mission. Little impediments like official 
rules are no excuse for failing in your mission. 
That’s the real rule, part of that alternative set of 
rules, the unspoken one: accomplish your mis-
sion: win. The fact that the alternative rules are 
so deeply ingrained explains, too, why it never 
even crossed my mind to report the possible war 
crimes of the first story. Moreover, this kind of 
activity cannot be merely the violation of one or 
two law-flouting bad apples in the barrel; it re-
quires complicity of everyone in the unit—with-
out exception.
So in almost any situation, you subconscious-
ly do the calculus. Which set of rules applies? 
The official ones or the real ones? They exist un-
easily side-by-side. And if I go by the real ones, 
what is the likelihood of getting caught? What 
are the consequences if I get caught? And how 
do those consequences compare with the conse-
quences of following the official set of rules but 
possibly failing in the mission? I know, of course, 
that if I get caught, the official rules apply; the 
very existence of the real rules—which were only 
unofficially taught—will be plausibly denied. All 
of these considerations come to mind, whether 
I incinerated the village where my thbuddy was 
killed, kept a string of dead enemy ears on my 
belt, conducted an energetic interrogation, or just 
snuck in some food. 
So far, in considering how to make ordinary 
people into killers, we have talked about de-
monization and depersonalization at one level. 
At a little deeper level there are the preparatory 
desensitizing effects of media and game violence 
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before one even enters the military. There is also 
the effect of technology like bombs, missiles, and 
drones, allowing easier remote killing. Then, at 
a still deeper and more sophisticated level, we 
have looked at the ambivalence of the rules. But 
we need to return to that still deeper question of 
whether military training and war itself tend to 
mess with our very DNA.
Let’s start with psychologist and retired Lt. 
Col. Dave Grossman’s description of basic train-
ing: 
Brutalization and desen-
sitization is what happens 
at boot camp. From the 
moment you step off the 
bus you are physically and 
verbally abused. Countless 
pushups, endless hours at 
attention or running with 
heavy loads, while carefully trained professionals 
take turns screaming at you. Your head is shaved, 
you are herded together naked, and dressed alike, 
losing all vestiges of individuality. This brutaliza-
tion is designed to break down your existing mores 
and norms and to [make you] accept a new set of 
values which embrace destruction, violence, and 
death as a way of life. In the end you are desen-
sitized to violence and accept it as a normal and 
essential survival skill in your brutal new world.4
Read those last two scary sentences again.
Consider also a few items from the U.S. Army 
website a few years ago. Again in bullet form:
• “American soldiers, possessed of a fierce war-
rior ethos and spirit, fight in close combat….”
• “No soldier can survive in the current bat-
tlespace without … continuous immersion in 
the Army’s Warrior culture.” 
• “[I]nculcating the Warrior ethos into all sol-
diers of both the active and reserve compo-
nents is one of their top priorities…”
• “The Warrior ethos statement contained with-
in the new Soldier’s Creed –‘I will always place 
the mission first [before the rules even??]. I will 
never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will 
never leave a fallen comrade’—is a key aspect 
of The Soldier focus area.” 
• “This is about shifting the mindset of Soldiers 
from identifying what they do as a Soldier— 
‘I’m a cook, I’m an infantryman, I’m a postal 
clerk’—toward ‘I am a Warrior’ when people 
ask what they do for a living.” 
• “This will require the deep and personal com-
mitment of every member of the Army team—
every leader, every Soldier, civilian, and every 
family member.”5 
Notice all the confessional religious lan-
guage and allusions: ethos, Creed, mission, 
spirit, immersion (as in baptism), commitment. 
The change said to be re-
quired to be a soldier is 
eerily parallel to Christian 
conversion. Recall Paul’s 
language in Ephesians 4 
and Colossians 3 of tak-
ing off the old self (civil-
ian) and putting on the 
new self (Warrior). Or consider Paul saying in II 
Corinthians 5:17 that if anyone is in Christ, he is 
a new creation. Parallel that with the idea that if 
anyone is in the Army, he is a new creation; the 
old (cook or postal clerk) is put away; the new 
(Warrior) is put on. 
Some say that the Army breaks you down and 
rebuilds you into the kind of creature it needs. 
Does it fully succeed? By God’s grace, no. Even 
the Army cannot totally erase the created way 
in which we reflect or image God. The extent of 
change and damage also varies immensely from 
one person to the next.
The reactions to that change vary as well. 
Among the many reactions was the serious prob-
lem of an extensive use of mind-altering drugs. I 
cannot erase from my mind, for example, a child 
under my command.
Yes, a child, the child of a mother, perhaps her 
only child, now about nineteen years old, soft-
spoken and gentle, addicted, terrified, crying. He 
stood before me like a scared bunny as I told him 
he was being transferred to an infantry unit. His 
performance of duty was impaired by his addic-
tion. He had been repeatedly warned that this 
transfer would happen if he did not smarten up 
and appreciate how good he had it.
I don’t know what happened to him after 
that. But in my worst imagination I have to an-
swer anguished questions from his mother:
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“How did my child, trained for and holding 
a comparatively safe position in military intelli-
gence, end up in an infantry unit?”
“Sending him to his death in a dangerous po-
sition was his punishment because he could not 
quickly drop his addiction after a few warnings?”
“The only possible treatment for his addiction 
was to make him canon fodder?”
I was hardly more mature than he was. One 
of the sad ironies of that war is that junior officers 
like me had to be quickly manufactured by mass 
production to fill the needed, low-level leadership 
positions. So inexperienced and ill-prepared kids 
were in command of other kids in life-and-death 
situations.
Now before we become too glibly critical 
about all of these nefarious things armies do, we 
need to explore our civilian complicity as well as 
the possible cruel irony that a lot of this may be 
necessary as long as we have or anticipate war.6 
The point is that we create armies to win wars. To 
what extent is it fair to then condemn them when 
they excel at manufacturing killers to do that? 
But military efforts to recreate a person into 
a killer do immense damage at that very deep 
DNA level—the level of self. Training already 
does that; combat exacerbates it. At the same 
time as soldiers are trained to dehumanize the 
enemy, they too are partly dehumanized. That’s 
why soldiering is arguably the most self-sacrificial 
of callings, not just because of the risk of physical 
death or injury but because it sacrifices the self at 
that very deep level. That’s why soldiers so often 
experience post-traumatic stress disorder and the 
more recently recognized disorder called moral 
injury,7 with all of their devastating consequenc-
es. I don’t know how reliable the statistics are, 
but already years ago I read that about 90% of 
Vietnam combat veterans were divorced and that 
we lost more to suicide than to enemy action. 
Iraq and Afghanistan veterans experience similar 
statistics. There are 18 veteran suicides a month; 
no, it’s 18 a week; no, really 18 a day, one every 
eighty minutes.8 With exaggeration, some have 
said that the dead are the fortunate casualties. 
They suffered for seconds, minutes, or hours be-
fore death. The walking wounded suffer for life. 
And it’s not just the training, the killing, the 
visions, and recollections of killing that torture 
post-war victims. It’s also the moral ambiguity 
that eats at them for the rest of life: ambiguity 
like that of our first story; ambiguity they know 
no one will understand; ambiguity that questions 
whether the horrific things they have seen and 
done were in any way justifiable; and sometimes 
ambiguity that they are forced to keep inside, 
knowing that sharing it might result in long and 
humiliating judgment and punishment under 
the official rules. 
War: what a murky, muddled, moral morass. 
What evil we are capable of. What opportunities 
for good we ignore. 
Yet that is not the last word. There is grace. I 
want to leave you with a poem, a poem that cul-
minates in the future, a poem that challenges us 
NOW to begin exchanging guns for garden tools 
and atomic bombs for medical isotopes. God will 
finish the job, but he calls us already now to be-
gin, by his grace, to make into reality the proph-
ecy of this poem:
They will beat their swords into plowshares 
and their spears into pruning hooks.
Nation will not take up sword against nation, 
nor will they train for war any more. 
Everyone will sit under their own vine 
and under their own fig tree,
and no one will make them afraid.
for the Lord Almighty has spoken.9
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